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International Affairs and  
Latvia’s Baltic Germans
MARTYN HOUSDEN
The history of independent Latvia in 1918–40 is in the process of being re-
examined and so the contribution of Latvia’s national minorities to the state is 
also ripe for review.  Current knowledge suggests that Latvia’s foreign policy, in 
the first place, was created by the ethnic Latvian officials of the Latvian Foreign 
Ministry; so why should this book discuss Baltic Germans who were outsiders 
to the policy process? Baltic Germans were Latvia’s citizens who, on their own 
behalf, contributed to international affairs on national, European and even world 
stages. Although their influence on Riga’s foreign policy was not always easy 
to trace, certainly they exercised influence in Berlin (with the German Foreign 
Ministry) and Geneva (with the League of Nations). As such, Baltic Germans 
were an important element of the Latvian demos, which the government of the day 
had to take into account as it made all of its policies, including foreign policy. 
Who were the Baltic Germans?
From medieval times, German knights, missionaries and traders arrived in 
the Baltic region. Bringing no serfs with them, they formed an upper class 
which owned land, monopolised social power and relied on the local peoples 
for labour. The Baltic Germans retained their multiple privileges when the 
Baltic lands were absorbed by the Russian Empire during the eighteenth 
century. From this point, the Germans’ chivalrous orders (Ritterschaften) 
ruled the region loyally for the Tsars. 
Never more than 10 % of the region’s population, the Baltic Germans were 
always cosmopolitan. Their Ritterschaften embraced Estonia, Oesel, Livonia and 
Courland. Education took them to Germany and Russia alike. Trade and imperial 
administration drew them across the Russian Empire wherever opportunity 
or duty dictated. Equally, over the centuries, waves of immigrants from the 
German heartland swelled the number of Germans in the region. Baltic Germans, 
then, comprised a social group that was always part of something bigger – and, 
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historically, its members always looked both East and West.  In this connection, 
they also believed they were the inheritors of a “mission”: namely to promote 
“Western,” “civilising” values in the face of “Eastern,” “Asiatic” chaos. 
Latvia’s independence and international networks
The Baltic Germans did not fit easily within an independent Latvia. During the 
Interwar period they were described as anti-modern, exhibiting a pre-capitalist, 
pre-democratic mentality and subject to agrarian-corporatist thinking. As the 
Tsar’s former leadership caste, many felt little natural affinity with the small, 
new nation state. During the First World War and its aftermath, too many Baltic 
Germans had, first, co-operated with the German occupation and, later, worked 
with the Niedra government. For too long the post-war National Committee, 
made up of former Baltic German elites, refused to recognise an independent 
Latvian state. It is ironic, therefore, that the Baltic German Landeswehr played a 
signal role in liberating the new state’s territory when it stormed Riga on 22 May 
1919, overthrowing the Bolshevik occupation. About a month later, however, 
the Landeswehr was itself prevented from advancing on Wenden by combined 
Latvian and Estonian forces.
With the collapse of empire, everything changed for the Baltic Germans. 
Without the Tsar, increasingly they looked to Berlin for sponsorship. 
Tens of thousands emigrated to Germany where, amongst other things, 
some lobbied they government over its “Eastern policy” (Ostpolitik). The 
community that remained in Latvia was all but devastated by the twin 
processes of decolonisation and Latvian state-building. Previously, ethnic 
Germans had owned 57 % of agricultural land in Latvia, but agrarian reform 
removed 2.7  million hectares from them. German community property 
was confiscated as organisations were closed. The German community lost 
control of both the Jakobi Church and Riga Cathedral. 
In the terms of the post-war peace treaties, the Baltic Germans transitioned 
from being ruling elites to “national minorities.” The new status provided 
them with a modicum of international protection as guaranteed by the 
League of Nations. In return, the “minority” was expected to live loyally in its 
new home. Certainly many contemporary Germans believed the scale of the 
changes presented them with a grave crisis of material existence and identity, 
but at least a few progressive voices (most notably Paul Schiemann) urged 
constructive engagement with the new state. The minority was represented by 
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eight parliamentary deputies. At various times it provided Ministers of Finance 
and Justice. Furthermore, as the new state was in the process of forming itself, 
the German community put itself at the vanguard of framing its multi-ethnic 
structure by promoting autonomous education for national minorities as 
defined by the schooling legislation of 8 December 1919. Thanks to this, the 
number of ethnic German schools rose from 46 in January 1920 to 93 in 
January 1922. This educational project always had an international dimension 
because, as early as May 1920, the ethnic German Wolfgang Wachtsmuth 
travelled to Berlin to secure funding for his community’s schools.
The impact on foreign affairs as delivered by Latvia’s Baltic Germans 
came not, therefore, from direct influence on policy-development in Riga’s 
Foreign Ministry but: first,  by the way the community sought to construct 
itself autonomously within the new Latvian nation state; and second by the 
way subsequently it attempted to gain a distinctive and independent purchase 
in international affairs. It pursued the latter aim by more elaborate strategies 
than just capitalising on good connections with Germany’s Foreign Ministry. 
Latvia’s Germans were just one of a series of ethnic German minorities left 
scattered around Central and Eastern Europe after 1918. In 1922, ethnic 
German community leaders from Estonia (Ewald Ammende) and Romania 
(Rudolf Brandsch) attempted to bring these communities together in the 
Association of German National Minorities in Europe. During the 1920s, this 
was a peaceful organisation dedicated to promoting common ethnic German 
interests and the autonomous development of ethnic German culture. For 
Latvia’s German community, Paul Schiemann quickly carved out a leading 
position in the organisation.
More ambitious still was the European Congress of Nationalities, 
which first met in Geneva in autumn 1925. Again the work of Ammende, 
the organisation provided a platform for all of Europe’s organised national 
minorities. In the event, most heavily represented were minorities from 
the states of Central and Eastern Europe which was home to the new and 
expanded states covered by post-war minority treaties administered by 
the League of Nations. The congress met in Geneva specifically to lobby 
the League. In time, it drew representatives from minority communities 
numbering as many as 40 million people. It was a considerable undertaking 
and ethnic Germans from Latvia, such as Schiemann and Baron Wilhelm 
Firks promoted their community’s values from its platform, as did several of 
Latvia’s Jewish community leaders.
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Between Riga and Berlin
With their own autonomous community established inside Latvia, with the 
League of Nations offering some international guarantees for minority rights, 
and with networks of international political connections, it was natural that 
the Baltic German community influenced Latvia’s international situation in a 
number of ways.
Part of something bigger
“For us [Baltic Germans], the German Reich certainly is much more than a 
large powerful neighbouring state. Above all, in the German Reich we see the 
heart of the entire great German nation. We Balts are just a tiny part of this and 
want to remain so.”1
The link between Latvia’s Baltic Germans and the German state could 
not be ignored by Riga’s policy-makers. For Baltic Germans, Germany 
was not just a nearby state, but a cultural community which they felt they 
belonged to, and to which they wanted to keep on belonging. The sentiment 
found some resonance in Berlin, with figures such as Prussian Minister of 
Culture Carl Becker recognising in 1919 that German foreign policy had to 
involve “policy towards Germandom abroad.” Unsurprisingly, therefore, 
following Wachtsmuth’s early success in acquiring funding for ethnic 
BARON WILHELM FIRKS was co-presenter of 
a petition to the League of Nations in 1925 which ar-
gued that land reform discriminated against the Bal-
tic German minority.
He was born in Kovno district in 1870 and 
went to school in Mitau before studying mining 
in Serbia, Spain and the Urals. Between 1911 and 
1916 he owned the estate of Wattram in Livonia and 
came to believe that historic land ownership offered 
something fundamental to Baltic German identity.
Personally, Firks was badly affected by agrarian 
reform. Thereafter, he was closely associated with 
organisations promoting Baltic German agrarian 
interests. In independent Latvia, he was a leading 
figure in the Baltic German National Party, deputy 
leader of the German party fraction and a member of the National Committee. 
Firks’ traditional conservative always put him at odds with the rise of Nazism.
Photo: Baltische Monatshefte 
(Ernst Plates: Riga, 1934), 
collection of  the National Library 
of Latvia
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PAUL SCHIEMANN was arguably the most im-
portant Baltic German of the Interwar period. As 
well as practicing politics in Latvia, he also devel-
oped theoretical ideas about the structure of mul-
ti-ethnic states. His arguments maintained consist-
ently that the German community should modernise.
During the First World War, Schiemann served 
as an officer in the Russian Army. In 1917 he fled 
Bolshevism, but soon found himself at odds with 
the German occupation authorities in the Baltic on 
account of his liberal democratic ideas. Expelled 
from the Baltic, he went to Berlin where, in 1918, he 
returned to his career as a journalist. That October, 
he co-authored a memorandum for Reich Chancellor 
Prince Max of Baden which demanded elected bodies for Lithuanian, Latvian and 
Estonian territories.
With peace, Schiemann returned to Riga. Here, he championed the 
Democratic Party, began editing Rigasche Rundschau, and also became a member of 
the National Assembly, the Constituent Assembly and the Saeima. Internationally 
he had excellent government connections in Berlin and also met the General 
Secretary of the League of Nations, Eric Drummond. Schiemann became a 
member of the Association of German National Minorities in Europe and the 
European Congress of Nationalities. 
Schiemann developed a particularly strong reputation as “the thinker” of the 
national minority movement. He developed a theory of the “anational state,” in which 
culture and politics should be separated. Then people could share territory based 
especially on common political requirements, whilst pursuing separate cultural lives 
according to each community’s national customs. As a democrat and a proponent 
of liberal tolerance, in the early 1930s Schiemann spoke out loudly against German 
National Socialism, criticising especially its anti-Semitism and general racism. As 
a result, soon he was sidelined in the Association of German National Groups in 
Europe, the European Congress of Nationalities and Rigasche Rundschau. 
The anational state
a. “Whoever has the will to belong to a national community does not need to 
belong to it racially and historically. By its very nature, the national community is a 
community of feeling.”
b. “That the nation as a national community can have no relation to territory arises 
from the fact that it cannot be delimited definitively in territorial fashion. This is 
because every territorial delimitation has to exclude a smaller or larger part of the 
national community.”*
* Paul Schiemann, “Volksgemeinschaft und Staatsgemeinschaft,” Nation und Staat, 
September 1927.
Photo: State Archives of Latvia 
(collected by John Hiden)
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German schools, subventions just kept on flowing from Berlin. Between 1923 
and 1928, the German state financed roughly 25 % of the budget deficit run 
up by Latvia’s German schools. Nor were subventions limited to education. 
The Gustav Adolf Association supported church organisations while the 
Concordia Literary Organisation (actually a front for German government 
funding) subsidised Rigasche Rundschau. Owing to the restrictions of the 
Treaty of Versailles, Germany’s support for ethnic Germans abroad always 
had to be delivered carefully and within limits; but even though only 
relatively small amounts of money were supplied, they were enough to enable 
Latvia’s Germans to consolidate their community. 
In terms of geo-strategy, Berlin wanted to build good relation with the so-
called “borderland states” (Randstaaten) lying between it and Russia. In the 
future, perhaps they could be used as a “springboard” for trade with the massive 
Russian market. Latvia offered good possibilities in this connection because, 
not least, much of the state’s industry historically had been owned by ethnic 
Germans and operated closely with Germany’s own industry. No surprise, 
therefore, that between 1919 and 1930, the proportion of Latvia’s imports 
sourced from Germany never fell below the considerable figure of 39 %. In 
terms of trade and industry, Germany and Latvia were drawing close together at 
this time, and the Baltic Germans had to be included as part of the process.
Furthermore, at this point Latvia’s Baltic Germans even wielded some 
influence on policy in Berlin. Paul Schiemann enjoyed some access to the 
corridors of power in the German Foreign Ministry and eventually met 
with Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann. Most likely under Schiemann’s 
influence, thereafter Stresemann produced a famous memorandum which 
recognised the significance of ethnic Germans to German trade policy, 
as well as recognising the importance of culturally autonomous social 
organisation for Europe’s national minorities.
The League of Nations: rights and petitions
If their national identity gave Baltic Germans some purchase in Berlin, their 
status as a “national minority” ensured them a hearing in Geneva. National 
self-determination lay at the heart of the First World War’s peace treaties. It 
provided the justification for the dismantling of old Empires in favour of 
nation states. But what of the national minorities left in the new, smaller 
structures? The Allied Powers decided that such minorities should be 
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protected by a series of treaties and agreements entered into by the new and 
enlarged states of Central and Eastern Europe, with the League of Nations 
guaranteeing their implementation. The first such treaty was agreed by 
Poland on 28 June 1919.
Latvia sought membership of the League on 14 May 1920. Like Poland, 
it was expected to subject its minority policy to international guarantee. 
The step, however, was unpopular with Latvia’s new political leaders 
because it implied giving up some state sovereignty to the League, promised 
international interference in Latvian domestic affairs and (since the Great 
Powers had signed no such treaties) spoke of unequal treatment of the 
League’s members. So although Latvia became a member of the League of 
Nations on 22 September 1921, its declaration about international minority 
protection was only made on 7 July 1923. It is important to note that the 
Baltic German community was not an integral part of Latvia’s negotiations 
with Geneva. Baltic Germans served only as commentators on the process 
and a pressure group attempting to influence events from the outside.
The Latvian view of international minority rights delivered to the 
League of Nations in 1922
“... as far as they [the principles of minority protection] have been clearly 
defined by the Treaties [ending the First World War], these general principles 
have always been observed by Latvia, which has moreover accorded better 
protection to Minorities than is the case in many other countries. The 
memorandum presented by the Latvian government to the League of Nations 
concerning Minorities is evidence of Latvia’s firm desire to continue to observe 
the general principles which she has accepted and also of her profound wish to 
contribute to the solidarity of all nations. 
I assure your Excellency that Latvia will always be glad to help in the 
establishment of a positive law for Minorities clearly drawn up and applicable to 
all countries, and guaranteed by the League of Nations.”2
The unwillingness of Latvian policy-makers to include minorities directly 
in discussions of the international guarantee of minority rights perhaps reflected 
how minority spokesmen had begun to use the League’s systems to put pressure 
on the new state through the presentation of petitions of complaint. As early 
as September 1921, Lucian Wolf (secretary to the Joint Foreign Committee 
of Jewish Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association) petitioned the League 
about anti-Semitism in Latvia. Latvian diplomats responded to the petition with 
gravity, but no procedures were actually changed within the country as a result 
of it. Four years later, Baron Firks and Manfred von Vegesack prepared another 
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petition about the treatment of ethnic German landowners as a result of agrarian 
reform. Two months later the Latvian government replied to the Firks-Vegesack 
petition, telling the League that agrarian reform was an absolute social necessity 
for the new state and that national minorities were not being discriminated 
against. Critical of the government’s position, Robert Cecil (League of Nations 
representative for the UK) observed that 96.5 % of the expropriated land had not 
belonged to ethnic Latvians and that persecution could not be turned into social 
reform by the use of clever words. 
Cecil is not persuaded
“Viscount CECIL thought that the [League of Nations] Committee was faced 
with a question of fact. It made very little difference what the Government 
had done with the expropriated land. There remained the fact that 96½ % had 
belonged to non-Latvians. Oppression could not be converted into a social 
reform by a mere change of name. It was evident that the Committee must 
further discuss the matter with the Latvian Government and, failing agreement, 
consult the Permanent Court.”3
The League found in favour of the petitioners and its officials were told to 
approach Riga to arrange compensation for former landowners. The Latvian 
government responded by emphasising that land reform was essential to the 
stability of Latvia and warned that changes to the status quo could encourage 
sympathy for communism. For their part, the Baltic German elites appeared 
ready both to take the issue to the Permanent International Court at The 
Hague and to use it for political ends. Given the difficult situation, the case 
was suspended, but never closed. Despite everything, however, compensation 
to former land owners remained minimal.
Schiemann discusses land reform with Eric Drummond, Secretary 
General of the League of Nations, 27 February 1925
“I saw Dr. Schiemann, the leader of the German faction in the Latvian parliament 
today. He said that things on the whole were going quite well. There were now 
only two outstanding questions which were of considerable importance.
1. The first was the payment to be made for the land which had been 
expropriated. The German landowners quite understood the necessity of 
agrarian reform; but they felt that they ought to be given either an increased 
price for the land taken, or – and this was the best solution put forward – that 
they should be allowed to retain larger holdings than was the case at present....
 I asked him how much had been offered by the law which had been 
proposed, but which had been defeated, owing to the German Minorities Party.
 He replied that all that had been suggested was a two-hundredth part of 
the real value.”4
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The limits to Berlin’s support
Although the Baltic Germans clearly spoke for themselves to the League of 
Nations, within Latvia, a perception endured that they were always prepared 
to promote Reich German interests. Such accusations came to the fore, 
for instance, in 1927 when Baltic German support for the Latvian-Russian 
Treaty was said to be in Berlin’s interest. Although such ways of thinking 
were evident in the Latvian press, they were too simple. Key Baltic German 
leaders in Latvia were prepared to build on the foundations of the new nation 
state. Both Firks and Schiemann understood well that the future of the Baltic 
Germans had to depend on co-operation with the Baltic peoples. 
Furthermore, despite the considerable mutual interest existing between 
the German state and Latvia’s Baltic Germans, in fact Berlin’s commitment to 
the group had distinct limits. Germany could not construct its foreign policy 
on a foundation provided by the Baltic Germans alone because they were not 
its final purpose. So although German state interests certainly did recognise 
the need to secure the welfare of Latvia’s Baltic Germans, more important 
still was the aim of the economic penetration of Eastern Europe. In this light, 
while Berlin wanted positive relations with Latvia’s German minority, even 
more important were good relations with the Latvian government.
Likewise, when German Ambassador to Latvia (1923–28) Adolf Koester 
spoke of the need to bind Latvia to Germany, he was not just recommending 
benefits for the Baltic Germans, since his arguments contained more general 
economic, political and cultural ideas. In fact, Koester was explicit that the 
creation of a strong bond between the Baltics and the Reich called for co-
operation between Baltic Germans and Latvians in order not to upset the 
achievement of bigger aims. German representatives in Riga understood 
well, therefore, that their policies towards the Baltic governments and the 
Baltic Germans had to move together as harmoniously as possible. On a 
more personal note, as a convinced social democrat Koester did not support 
hereditary landownership by the Baltic Germans (Bodenständigkeit) and was 
not terribly concerned if some German farmers in Latvia’s rural areas faced 
assimilation by the majority ethnic group.
Lobbying Berlin with Koester
“We travelled together and I spent 3–4 days with him [Ambassador Koester] 
and Schiemann in Berlin. It wasn’t very easy for me to keep up with my 
colleagues who both rejoiced in a considerable lust for life and had a tremendous 
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capacity for consuming alcohol. We arrived at the ‘Russischen Hof ’, opposite 
the Friedrichstrasse railway station. My expectation that we would pursue our 
affairs in the Foreign Ministry straight away on the day after our arrival proved 
not to be correct. For two or three days until late into the night we visited 
restaurants and all kinds of places of pleasure. Koester found acquaintances 
everywhere. He was thoroughly amusing and witty and filled with an 
indestructible vitality.”5
1930s: “Nationalismus überalles”
Among the Baltic Germans, there were always people who disliked being 
termed a “minority.” For them, being labelled based on the number 
of members of their community de-valued the quality of the historic 
contribution they had made to the Baltic area. They wanted to be respected 
as a “national group.” The national pride sometimes associated with German 
heritage only increased throughout the 1930s as, first, Hitler approached 
political power and, then, began to build the Third Reich. His virulent politics 
crossed political borders to infect Europe’s ethnic Germans.
Germany for the Germans! Latvia for the Latvians!
“Germany for the Germans! What a well-known sound for every politician 
in the East! Latvia for the Latvians! Poland for the Poles! Romania for the 
Romanians! Greater Serbia for the Serbs! It is the call to arms of ‘national’ 
economic policy across the whole of East and South East Europe! Economic 
autarky and nation state thinking are the foundations of this policy. A 
policy which threatens to bring a series of new states to the edge of economic 
breakdown through corruption and lack of productivity.... A policy against 
which especially the German minorities at the Geneva nationalities congress 
have protested particularly forcibly and with good reason.”6
Some brave individuals stood firmly against Nazism. In 1932, Paul 
Schiemann gave a strongly anti-Nazi speech to the Association of German 
National Groups in Europe (renamed from the Association of German 
National Minorities in Europe). He denounced “the new nationalist wave” 
crashing across Europe from West to East which was damaging Baltic 
German youth. Unfortunately, fine words were not enough and Nazism found 
willing accomplices among Latvia’s Germans, especially Erhard Kroeger 
who led “the Movement.” In his memoirs, Kroeger denied “the Movement” 
(founded in 1933) took its orders from Berlin, but certainly during the 1930s 
he made connections with Reinhard Heydrich (Chief of the Reich Security 
Head Office) and Heinrich Himmler (Reich Leader of the SS). Although 
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older traditional conservative Baltic Germans generally remained sceptical 
about Hitler, as the Third Reich became stronger, so the appeal of “the 
Movement” grew.
New nationalist wave
a. “This is the nationalism of contemporary Europe which has received a 
considerable boost from the obvious victory of nationalist thinking in the world 
war. The proclamation of the right to national self determination has given new 
theoretical foundations to the aim of creating an identity which brings together 
membership of the national group and membership of the state. The fight 
about national law, which we are called on to fight, has no other goal than, in 
consciousness of Mankind, to destroy the necessity of this identity.”
b. “There is a new nationalist wave, which slowly but surely has crashed over 
this ideological moment and which now has transferred the idea of the powerful 
nation state into our region.”7
The Ulmanis coup took place on 15 May 1934 and quickly the new 
regime took steps to ban the Nazi movement and its newspaper, Rigaer 
Tageblatt. In 1936, leading Nazi sympathisers were arrested temporarily, 
but more general steps were also taken against the German community. 
Autonomous German schooling had been under political pressure since 1931 
when Education Minister Ķēniņš began a quest to create a unified Latvian 
culture, but now more decisive steps were undertaken. In July 1934, the 
existing system of school autonomy was abolished and direct administration 
of German schools by the Ministry of Education was applied. Further laws 
followed which restricted the use of German language in the public sphere, 
limited the number of Germans able to practice law and made it difficult for 
Germans to buy land. At the same time, steps were taken to impose state 
ownership on private industry, with German and Jewish enterprises being 
nationalised with disproportionate enthusiasm. 
Once, Ulmanis commented that limiting Baltic German power was 
one of his most important tasks. More dramatically, Latvia’s Ambassador 
to Warsaw Ēķis once described to Foreign Minister Munters how Latvia’s 
Germans were a bridgehead for a foreign power and could be used to 
pressurise the Latvian state at home and abroad. For such Latvian figures, the 
anti-minority and specifically anti-Nazi measures of the 1930s were necessary 
steps for self defence. German figures, however, saw things differently. In 
spring 1936, German Ambassador to Riga Schack reported to Berlin about a 
“campaign of annihilation” against the German minority. When Munters met 
German Foreign Minister von Neurath in June 1936 he denied there was a 
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policy directed specifically against Baltic Germans, but also complained that 
they kept on demanding special rights. 
Latvia’s new laws certainly sought to decrease ethnic German power in 
society, but the diplomatic interactions suggest the Ulmanis government 
wanted to avoid antagonising Berlin as much as possible during the process. 
The desire not to provoke Hitler became more marked in 1938. That March, 
German Foreign Ministry official von Mackensen told Latvian Ambassador 
Celmiņš that attacks on Baltic German economic life would have serious 
ERHARD KROEGER founded “the Movement.” 
He liaised with SS offices in Berlin and played a lead-
ing role in organising the resettlement of the Baltic 
Germans to Warthegau in 1939–40.
Kroeger was born in Riga on 24 March 1905. 
He matriculated from a German grammar school in 
Latvia before studying at universities in Germany 
and Riga. By the end of the 1920s, Kroeger had 
begun writing articles about the cultural mission 
of the ethnic Germans. He favoured some kind 
of Führer-principle over parliamentarianism and 
ideas like this brought him into conflict with the 
traditional conservatives who headed Latvia’s Baltic 
German community. In 1933 he founded “the Movement” which aimed to build a 
national community based on principles of German socialism and under a united 
leadership. He took inspiration from Nietzsche’s philosophy.
In June 1933, the Latvian state rejected the Movement’s application to be 
recognised as a political party and thereafter Krieger had to organise illegally. In 
March 1934, pressure was increased on Kroeger as the Saeima agreed the dismissal 
of all officials in key civic offices who belonged to the Movement. Two years later, 
Kroeger and some associates were arrested temporarily for pro-Nazi activities.
Following the establishment of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle in Berlin in 
1936, Kroeger intensified his contacts with government and Nazi Party offices in 
Germany, and stepped-up especially his youth work in Latvia. During late 1938, 
personnel changes at the head of Latvia’s German community which gave Kroeger 
a significant powerbase within it. Swiftly he was promoted to SS-Standartenführer 
in order to help organise the fateful resettlement action. In January 1940 he was 
appointed member of the Reichstag for Wartheland. 
During the Nazi attack on Russia, Kroeger led Einsatzkommando Nr. 6 in 
Einsatzgruppe C under SS-Brigadeführer Otto Rasch. Later he was involved with the 
Vlasov Army and in January 1945 was appointed SS-General.
He died on 24 September 1987 without ever becoming a democrat.
Photo: National Archives of Estonia 
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consequences for German-Latvian relations. The warning was repeated 
by a German diplomat to Munters in May 1938. Then came the Munich 
Agreement at which point the burgeoning of Reich power in Central and 
Eastern Europe was clear for all (except perhaps some English statesmen) 
to see. Apparently Munich provoked a policy re-think in Riga, such that a 
German-Latvian trade agreement was concluded in November 1938 and 
some domestic anti-German initiatives were discontinued.
But the framework for ethnic German politics was changing all the 
time, with the scope for independent action being supplanted. In 1933, 
the European Congress of Nationalities fell apart over the treatment of 
Jews in Germany. It was never the same again. Soon thereafter, Sudeten 
Germans seized control of the Association of German National Groups in 
Europe, sidelining the interests of “Germans abroad” (Auslanddeutschen) in 
favour of those of “borderland Germans” (Grenzlanddeutschen). Efforts to 
instrumentalise ethnic Germans for Berlin’s politics took a big step forwards 
in 1936 when the Ethnic German Central Agency (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle 
or VoMi) was established. With this step, the SS put itself at the vanguard 
of ethnic German politics. Corresponding to the new mood, late 1938 
saw significant changes in the personalities leading the German national 
community in Latvia. The old guard of traditional conservative power-
brokers was pushed aside and space was created for Kroeger and his acolytes. 
A few months later, on 19 April 1939, the leader of Latvia’s Baltic 
Germans, Alfred Intelmann, met with Ulmanis and requested autonomy for 
his community. This was, however, rejected since following the annexation of 
Bohemia and Moravia attitudes had once again changed within the Latvian 
government. The United Kingdom had issued its guarantee to Poland on 31 
March 1939 and the step encouraged a feeling of assertiveness in the Latvian 
government. By this point, however, the time for discussion was all but past 
and Latvian views of Baltic Germans were all but irrelevant. 
Resettlement
Contacts between Erhard Kroeger and the VoMi were increasing all the time. 
In Autumn 1939 he was promoted to SS-Standartenführer and designated 
local leader of the resettlement of ethnic Germans from Latvia and Estonia 
to the German sphere of interest. Kroeger’s ascendancy reflected the secret 
clauses of the Hitler-Stalin Pact which allocated the Baltic States to a Soviet 
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sphere of interest. Apparently Kroeger contributed to the resettlement 
project, meeting Himmler in Zoppot on 25 September 1939 and advising that 
all Baltic Germans would be endangered by a Soviet occupation owing to the 
community’s historic anti-communism. Within two days, Hitler had decided 
to “return” all the Baltic Germans to the Reich. By this point, the German 
community was largely demoralised and most of its number agreed they had 
to leave their historic homeland. With this, the centuries’ long history of a 
community was brought to a close. 
The decision
“25.9.39
The goal of our journey was reached. The Kasino Hotel in Zoppot, the 
most lovely hotel of the Ostsee Baths was Führer HQ , the centre of the 
greatest military and political power in Europe. Security was not strict and 
Dr.Buchardt’s SS pass was good enough for us both.... Behind a glass door 
left ajar there was, in a side room, a roundtable discussion visibly in excited 
conversation. I recognised Adolf Hitler, beside him Himmler, then Keitel, 
Ribbentrop and others. We sat ourselves at one of the little tables and waited for 
what would happen to us.  Soon Walter Schellenberg appeared, liaison officer 
with the Reichsführer-SS, and said Himmler had been told about me and that the 
discussion would still take place tonight.....”
“26.9.39
At around 10 o’clock I was invited by Heinrich Himmler to a second short 
discussion.  The result was unequivocal: during the night Himmler had 
put the question of the Baltic Germans to the Führer and Reich Chancellor 
and had reported about our conversation.  The Führer was basically 
in agreement with the evacuation of the whole of the Baltic German 
population but wanted the action to happen in agreement with the Soviet 
government....”8
Very few Baltic Germans failed to leave Latvia for Warthegau, but Paul 
Schiemann remained. During the Nazi occupation of the Second World War 
he was put under house arrest, but still managed to save a Jewish girl from the 
Holocaust. As a result, Israel honours him as one of the Righteous Among 
Nations. 
Conclusion and wider questions
National minorities have been described as both “disturbers of peace” and 
“bridges of understanding.” During the Interwar years, the Baltic Germans 
played both positive and negative roles in Latvia’s history, influencing foreign 
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affairs accordingly. Nonetheless, much scope remains for work to analyse 
more precisely and fully the group’s impact on foreign policy development. 
Not least, did Latvian politicians have any ideas about how best to use the 
Baltic German community as an asset for bridge-building with Germany? 
And what was the detail of Latvian government responses to the League of 
Nations’ minority protection system, both as it negotiated its declaration and 
as it responded to petitions? These are open questions.
More generally, this discussion of foreign affairs has highlighted wider 
questions about the place of the Baltic Germans within independent Latvia. 
This essay has given the impression that pro-German action was really only 
undertaken by Latvian governments when it was necessary pragmatically. 
Hence the schooling legislation of 1919 was agreed when the state was still 
young and finding its way, likewise anti-German policy was only stopped 
in 1938-39 as a result of Hitler’s increasing power in Central and Eastern 
Europe. But did sympathy for Baltic Germans ever go beyond pragmatics in 
Latvian politics? Were German statesmen ever included in parliamentary 
coalitions for reasons other than just the game of building parliamentary 
majorities? Did Latvian voters ever support German political parties for 
reasons other than protesting against what Latvian parties were offering? 
And was there ever meaningful overlap between Baltic German and Latvian 
politicians in the field of ideas? To provide answers here, we await the 
necessary detailed research.
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